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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine the relationship between house price and Islamic bank 
stability in Malaysia. In particular, in relating to Islamic bank stability to Malaysian 
house price changes, we evaluate the nature of the relationship from the perspective 
of nonlinearities.  The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model is applied to a 
sample that consists of 9 Islamic banks in Malaysia for the period of 2000-2016. Our 
results indicate that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between house price 
and Islamic bank stability in the long run. Meanwhile, the relationship is insignificant 
in the short-run.  To put it differently, initially, the higher house prices, the more stable 
the bank. Then, the impact of house prices on bank stability becomes negative when 
house prices surpass the threshold point. As far as the bank-specific characteristics 
are concerned, the cost to income ratio is found to significantly and negatively related 
to the bank stability. Such a result has policy implications in which it is crucial for 
achieving balance in the housing market, and efficiently managing the cost is equally 
important to ensure Islamic bank soundness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid appreciation of house prices subsequently followed by the financial 
crisis tends to suggest that house price changes as an essential indicator predicting 
future financial distress. Such a notion gives prominence to the overvaluation of the 
housing market and the soundness of the bank. Meanwhile, there is an increasing 
attention on the financial stability of Islamic banking in the recent year. Empirical 
evidence shows that the financial crisis has affected Islamic banks differently 
compared to conventional banks. Islamic banks seem to perform better with a 
more favorable credit risk during the financial crisis (Hasan & Dridi, 2010). Beck 
et al. (2013) suggests that Islamic banks have a better asset quality management 
and higher capitalization, and are more stable than conventional banks. Baele et 
al. (2014) argues that Islamic banks have lower probability of default as they have 
lesser default loan. 
Despite the strong evidence which Islamic banks are more stable than 
conventional banks, they not without failure. For example, the Souk al-Manakh 
crisis caused a crash in the stock market in 1982. The crash quickly propagated to 
the real estate sector, and most of Kuwait’s banks become insolvent. Islamic Bank 
of South Africa failed in 1997 due to its poor credit risk management, insecure 
lending, and fraud. Ihlas Finans House collapsed during the banking crisis in 2000. 
By law, the Islamic bank could not invest in securities. When the shock kicked in, 
Ihlas Finans House faced a run as most of the investments were in illiquid asset 
(Ahmed et al., 2014). 
Islamic finance has grown exponentially in the past three decades. The global 
Islamic banking asset achieved $1.9 trillion in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). Presently, 
Malaysia Islamic banking asset hits approximately $150 billion and stands 27% of 
Malaysia’s total banking system (The Malay Mail, 2016). On the one hand, Islamic 
banking captures 23% of market share in the entire Malaysia banking sector. 
From 2006 to 2016, the average y-o-y growth Islamic bank lending has managed 
a double-digit growth of nearly 20%. Whereby, the total lending for the purchase 
of residential property expands tremendously, from RM17.1 billion in 2006Q4 to 
RM108.5 billion 2016Q3. The total lending for the purchase of residential property 
became the largest proportion since 2014 (BNM, 2016).
Unlike the conventional bank, Islamic banking adheres to the Islamic law, 
such as profit and risk sharing, the prohibition of interest, and the prohibition of 
holding a toxic asset. Meanwhile, Islamic banking still confronts extra risk due to 
its complexity mode and limited investment choices. In Malaysia, there is a notable 
high proportion of Islamic bank lending to the property sector. Financing to the 
activity of the property sector has been the focus as such a financing fits the Islamic 
principle, which involves asset-based in all transaction. In other words, real estate 
exposure may be the most significant threat to Islamic banking, especially as the 
majority of the balance sheet binds to the real estate asset. 
Theoretically, the relationship between house price and the bank can be 
explained by the deviation hypothesis and collateral hypothesis. The positive 
correlation between house prices and bank stability refers to the deviation 
hypothesis. According to this viewpoint, persistently high house prices could 
increase the accumulation of risky assets and larger bank exposure when banks 
lend to the risky borrower given that everyone is expecting the price to continue 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, Number 1, February 2019 3
to grow. Meanwhile, the collateral hypothesis suggests that higher house prices 
improve bank stability given the collateral value have increased. In the past two 
decades, Malaysia house price grew steadily, nearly 3.2% annually. Then, the 
house price recorded a remarkable high growth rate, exceeding 9% annually after 
2010. According to the Central Bank of Malaysia or Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), 
the Malaysia house price grew steadily, approximately 3.2% in the past decades. 
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One of the reasons attributed to the rapid expansion in housing price after 
the year 2010, was the increase in speculative purchases in 2010 (BNM, 2015). 
As a large proportion of credit has been lending out to the property market, the 
unsustainable boom in the real estate market may adversely affect the Islamic 
bank and the economy. Additionally, the property foreclosure rate in Malaysia 
shows an upward trend in recent year. Approximate 2,056 properties are being 
put up for auction every month (The Edge, 2016). As the home foreclosure rate is 
on the rise, this signifies uncertainty in the housing market and may jeopardize 
the bank. Generally, the Z-score index is the common measures of bank stability. 
The analysis of index involves the collection and interpretation of the accounting 
data, which allow us to evaluate how the individual bank’s capital can absorb 
the variability of returns. Based on the historical trend analysis (refer figure 1), 
before the housing boom, the Islamic Bank’s Z-score exhibit a generally upward 
trend.  The Z-score value is lingering at a value between 5 to 7-unit point. Then the 
series showed evidence of a decrease after the year 2010. When the house price is 
accelerating, the risk taker investor could have seeking fund from the bank and 
expecting a further price increase. This could have accumulated some amount of 
risky asset for the bank.  Another possible reason to explain the plunge of Z-score 
Figure 1.
The Average Z-Score Index For The Islamic Bank From 2000Q1 To 2016Q3.
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index is the increase in the number of full-fledged Islamic banks. By the year 2010, 
the number of Islamic Bank increased to seventeen as banking licenses were issued 
to foreign Islamic banking players. This translated to greater competition among 
the Islamic banks. These banks may hold lesser capital and lending out more loans 
under a more competitive environment, leading to a drop in Z-score (Keeley, 1990; 
Beck et al., 2013; Jiménez et al., 2013).
In light of these, the present paper contributes to the existing literature by 
empirically examining the relationship between house prices and Islamic bank 
stability in Malaysia. We explore the nature of this relationship from the nonlinear 
perspective. Some studies suggest an asymmetric relationship between banks and 
asset prices (Pan & Wang, 2013; Gennaioli et al., 2012; Dieci & Westerhoff, 2012). 
For instance, the theory of “local thinking” underpins the nonlinear relationship 
between the asset price and bank stability. These studies argue that investors are 
subject to limited ability and rely on a simple heuristic in predicting the return. 
The “local thinking,” which was introduced by Gennaioli & Shleifer (2010), 
explained that not all the contingencies are included in the decision-making. As 
such, financial fragility may arise when new securities are issued excessively. A 
significant decline in asset price causes adverse effects after a market shock. On the 
other hand, when speculative force mingles with the housing demand and supply, 
this creates a complex price dynamic. Some optimistic investors expect continuous 
growth in housing, but some believe the mean reversion theory, which leads to the 
asymmetric response to the information (Dieci & Westerhoff, 2012). 
Our study seeks to contribute to the literature as follows. First, we adopted 
the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to estimate the long run 
and short-run relationships between changes in house prices and Islamic bank 
stability in Malaysia. Although ample studies have evaluated the impact of house 
prices and bank stability, the focus is on the conventional banks from advanced 
economies. Second, we use a Z-score to measure bank stability. We used the 
disaggregate bank-specific data in computing the Z-score to measure the solvency 
risk at the level of the individual institution. Finally, we address the presence of 
nonlinearities in estimating the relationship between house prices and Islamic 
bank stability. This allows us to examine whether Z-score responds differently to 
changes in house prices when house prices reach a certain extreme point.   
In summary, this paper reveals supported evidence of the house price changes 
affects Islamic bank stability. According to Khor and Kee (2008), persistent house 
price acceleration distorted the equilibrium in the market. Aforementioned, 
Malaysian Islamic banks are potentially exposed to the real estate market. In 
the past decades, the ratio of house financing to the total lending in the Islamic 
banking system grew from 17.6% to 28.4% (BNM, 2018). Whereby, the housing 
market in Malaysia posted slowing down in the recent year. This could be a major 
threat for the bank especially the number of unsold residential properties showing 
an upward trend. Hence, further analysis of the house price changes and financial 
soundness is essential. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
section 2 presents a review of past studies; section 3 describes the data source and 
methodology applied in this research study; section 4 presents the discussion of 
result; and section 5 will be the concluding remark.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Theoretical Literature
According to the classic banking theory, the linkage between the housing market 
and finance structure has been addressed in the model of Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) and Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). Bernanke and Gertler (1989) underline the 
asymmetric information in explaining the interaction between the asset price, 
bank and economy. During the economic downturn, the presence of asymmetric 
information increases the agency cost and jeopardizes the borrowing. This causes 
the collateral value to plunge and further amplified the impact of output volatility. 
On the other hand, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) emphasized the interaction 
between the asset price and credit constraint and has explained that a slight 
economic shock might be intensified due to the existence of credit constraint. The 
model assumed that collateral is required for every lending to occur, and this has 
caused a more fluctuating output. Thus, the housing market boom is associated 
with the expansion of the bank’s balance sheet as the capital value has increased. 
Consequently, this has enabled the bank to borrow more, given that the net worth 
has gained.  
The second strand of the theories highlighted the bank’s fundamental financial 
structure in explaining financial instability. Chiesa (2001) and Diamond and Rajan 
(2006) suggested that the bank is vulnerable when the borrowers fail to fulfill 
the obligations. Bank further tightened the bank lending in response to the bank 
losses and triggered the depositor run. This exacerbated the effect of financial 
distress. However, Chiesa (2001) particular emphasizes that the credit derivation 
determines by the profit margin given to the monitoring cost. Hence, the capital 
requirement is essential to suppress the risk-taking incentive. Meanwhile, Von 
Peter (2009) extended the model by Diamond and Rajan (2006) and demonstrated 
a framework to show the linkage between bank loss, bank default and real estate. 
He recognizes the difference between macroeconomic and financial instability, 
while macroeconomic and financial instability could reinforce each other. He 
argues that bank financial position deteriorated when house prices decline and 
weaken the bank asset. Then, the bank could be unstable even without a bank run. 
The capital crunch model, which introduced by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), 
formulated a moral hazard framework to describe the relationship between bank’s 
capital and firm’s net worth, while Chen (2001) extended the model by including 
the asset price as the key variable.  More specifically, these models differ from the 
existing literature by taking into consideration of the spillover effect to the bank 
when the firm’s balance sheet deteriorated. Following the shock, the bank fragility 
magnified the impact and affected the investment. 
As credit risk is the primary concern for the bank, some studies develop a 
model to show the interaction between housing market, credit risk and financial 
stability. This can be elaborated by the collateral value hypothesis suggesting that 
higher asset price increases collateral value and reduces the credit risk. The model 
proposed by Daglish (2009) acknowledges the collateral value effect and focus on 
the probability of default by observing the borrower’s optimal default decision. 
He has argued that the likelihood of default is highly responsive to the variation 
of interest rate and house price, and default rate tends to be high during a surge 
of interest rate and fall of housing price. However, moral hazard arises in banking 
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when there are changes in collateral value. This is further discussed by Niinimaki 
(2009). The study has proposed that banks should finance those risky projects 
as they expect an appreciation of the asset with a significant profit in the future. 
Additionally, the banks are exposed to risks when bank assets depreciate. On the 
other hand, the deviation hypothesis posits a positive relationship between house 
price and the credit risk. When the asset price is too high and substantially greater 
than its fundamental value, the bank risk is significantly higher. The bank crisis 
model presented by Allen & Gale (2001) demonstrates that excessive expansion 
of credit advocates speculative activities. As a result, the asset price increases and 
surpasses its fundamental value. When the asset return is uncertain, the bank is 
at risk.
2.2. Empirical Literature
Our empirical literature mainly emphasizes on the relationship between house 
price and bank stability. In the literature, there are several measures of bank 
stability. Many studies agree that non-performing loans have been a crucial 
indicator to show the resilience of the financial system, for instance, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008), Messai and Jouini (2013), Vogiazas & Nikolaidou (2011). These 
studies concluded that bank provisions increase with non-performing loans and 
strike at the bank capital, and as the sources of systemic risk. Some other studies 
applied bank’s specific factors (CAMEL) as a measure of bank stability, the reviews 
are included Bongini et al. (2001), Calomiris & Mason (2003b), and Cebula et al. 
(2011). However, the drawback of using this measure is the CAMEL rating is not 
forward-looking and may not be good enough to track the emerging risk. Another 
balance sheet variable such as Z-score ratio is described as the alternate proxy of 
bank stability (Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Khaddafi et al. 2017; De Young & Torna, 
2013). Z-score measures the distance to default and is used in the banking system. 
They have calculated the standard deviation of the return of asset, return of equity, 
the ratio of loan loss provision and insolvency risk to represent the bank risk. 
Some studies make a comparative analysis of bank stability between the 
Islamic bank and the conventional when the shock hits the bank. For instance, 
Alqathani and Mayes (2018) focus on the bank from Gulf Cooperation Council and 
argue that Islamic bank is more vulnerable compared to the conventional bank if 
Islamic banks operate at a large scale, especially in the later stage of the crisis. This 
empirical estimation seems to support the findings of Cihak and Hesse (2010) and 
Abedifar et al. (2013). Although the Islamic bank is practicing the risk sharing, 
the significant exposure to the real estate market has resulted in instability. In 
contrast, Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) reveal no significant difference in stability for 
both conventional and Islamic banks during the financial panic.  
Majority of the studies explore the impact of house price on bank stability 
through the credit risk channels. The relationship between housing and bank 
stability has been highlighted in the study of Koetter and Poghosyan (2010), Pan 
and Wang (2013). Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) evaluate the real estate prices 
and bank stability by accessing the probability of bank distress due to the rapid 
growth in the German real estate market. They addressed that the deviations 
of house prices from their fundamental value are one of the potential risks that 
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contribute to the instability of financial systems. They showed evidence to support 
the deviation hypothesis. In other words, house prices in Germany exceeded their 
fundamental value and harmed the banking stability. Alternatively, Pan and Wang 
(2013) examined the impact of house price changes on bank stability at various 
income levels in 286 of U.S. housing markets. They showed evidence of a negative 
link between housing markets and bank stability. Nevertheless, the house price 
deviation increased nonperforming loans during the economic downturn. 
The relationship between real estate and the Islamic bank has been described 
in the study of Abdul-rahman et al. (2017), Abdul-Rahman (2009) and Chakroun 
& Gallali (2011). Abdul-rahman et al. (2017) explore the relationship between 
financing structure and bank liquidity in Malaysia. They compare the impact of 
real estate financing on conventional and Islamic banks. They concluded that real 
estate finance increased the liquidity risk of Islamic banks, but had no impact on 
the conventional bank. These findings fit with the work of Abdul-Rahman (2009), 
who found Malaysian Islamic banking highly exposed to real estate financing. It 
was demonstrated that Islamic banking is in favor of offering lending and credit to 
real estate even though it is riskier. Meanwhile, Chakroun & Gallali (2011) argue 
that the subprime mortgage crisis has a negative impact on the conventional bank 
but no impact on Islamic bank. However, Islamic banks have a lower recovery rate 
of the non-performing loan. 
Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017) assess Islamic bank stability in Malaysia. They 
considered the size of the bank in explaining bank stability. The larger bank is 
found to be more stable in the study, especially when the bank is subjected to 
the capital stringency. While Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010) also focus on the 
Malaysian Islamic bank. They explore the relationship between asset quality 
and bank profitability and confirm a negative relationship. This result seems to 
contradict the studies done by Kosmidau et al. (2005) and Choong et al. (2012). 
They evaluate the impact of three risks, namely liquidity risk, concentration risk 
and credit risk on the profitability of an Islamic bank, and concluded a positive 
relationship.  
Besides that, the relationship between bank-specific variables and stability has 
been highlighted in the studies of Zarrouk (2012) and Berger & Deyoung (1997). 
Zarrouk (2012) argue that bank-specific variables are adversely affected the bank 
performance especially after the financial crisis of 2008. Islamic banks also found 
to involve in excessive risk-taking in UAE. Meanwhile, Berger & Deyoung (1997) 
found evidence to support the bad management hypothesis and the moral hazard 
hypothesis. They conjecture that cost efficiency and capitalization are important 
variables in determining bank risk. A similar result is concluded by Podpiera & 
Weill (2008). They focused on the emerging market, and suggest cost inefficiency 
raised nonperforming loans. Despite this evidence, Salas & Saurina (2002) study 
the case of Spain in favor of the moral hazard hypothesis. They showed evidence 
that the high capitalization enhanced the quality of the loans. This implies that 
banks tend to offer risky loans when the capital is low.
On aggregate, based on our theoretical and empirical review, a vast body of 
studies documented evidence that bank profitability, loan loss, cost efficiency 
and liquidity are the major drivers of bank instability. However, the impact of 
house price changes on bank stability is non-negligible. Despite that, there is no 
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conclusive answer to the question of whether the higher house price is positively 
or negatively related to financial stability. Additionally, the majority of the studies 
employed cross-country data, and consequently made the comparability between 
the key variables more complex. Given the mixed findings, our research aims to 
reconcile the contradiction by testing both collateral and deviation hypothesis.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data
The data are quarterly data, the period of analysis span from 2000Q1 to 2016Q3. 
The coverage period is based on data availability. The quarterly data on the house 
price index was obtained from the National Property Information Centre (NAPIC), 
and the data for the unemployment rate were extracted from the data stream. 
One reason that the unemployment rate is included as the proxy for economic 
conditions is the unemployment rate could have triggered the loan default and 
affected the new loan demand. This could further depress the bank’s Z-score. On 
one hand, we consider the effect of bank characteristic on bank stability. These are 
included capitalization (equity/total asset), management skill (cost to income ratio), 
and earnings (return to asset). The higher capitalization is expected to promote 
bank stability. This is because greater capital enables risk absorption. While the 
interaction between the cost and income ratio is expected to yield a negative 
sign. The lower cost to income ratio implicates more cost efficiency and thereby 
more stability. Meanwhile, a positive sign is possible if the non-finance income 
did not drive the lower cost efficiency ratio. Besides that, higher profitability is 
expected to enhance bank stability.  Following the study by Pan & Wang (2013) 
and Koetter & Poghosyan (2010), we measure the bank stability using Z-score. 
The Z-score is calculated as the sum of return on assets and equity to total asset 
ratio, and its relation to the standard deviation of return on assets of a bank. The 
data are collected from the published annual financial statement of 9 local Islamic 
banks1. The financial report of the respective bank is made available in Central 
Bank Malaysia. The list of the banks are presented in Appendix A. Additionally, to 
mimic the house price data, the bank-specific data and the Z-score are aggregated 
by using the simple average approach. On the other hand, all variables are 
seasonally adjusted following the census X-12 procedure. This approach is based 
on the moving averages, and smooth out the series by eliminating the regular 
seasonal fluctuation.  
1. There are total 10 local Islamic Bank in Malaysia. To address the issue of an outlier, our study has 
excluded Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. Bank Islam Malaysia has suffered a massive loss in the 
year 2005 and therefore the financial ratio has been underperformed relative to all other Islamic 
banks. As only 18 observations (18 years) obtained from the annual report, we carry out a frequency 
conversion by using Eviews. The linear match last approach is selected.   To tackle the measurement 
bias, following the study by Li (2015) a sensitivity test on the interpolated series is done.  
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3.2 Method
In this section, we briefly explain the model specification and method applied in 
this study. Following the study by Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) and Pan & 
Wang (2013), our baseline model as follow:
stability = f (macroeconomic factor,bank-specific variable,house price) (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
To restate, the Z-score is used to measure bank stability. ZISL denotes the 
z-score for Islamic bank. House price index is the proxy of the house price. In 
addition to that, macroeconomic changes often related to bank stability. As the 
unemployment rate has a direct impact on loan loss, we include the unemployment 
rate as one of the key variables. At the bank level, we employ three control bank-
specific variables that denote X in equation 2 which include cost efficiency ratio 
(COST). 
As the relationship between house price changes and bank stability is 
potentially nonlinear. One of the fundamental reason to explain the nature of 
the relationship is the bounded rationality decision making. Hence, our study 
included the squared term of HPI in the model. The model (2) is extended, and the 
model is outlined in the following manner:  
To detect the long-run relationship between bank stability and house prices, 
we use the ARDL approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). All to all, the estimation 
involves taking four steps. First, the stationarity of the variables will be tested. This 
is because integration of I(2) is not permitted. In addition to that, the structural 
break unit-root test is performed to detect the potential structural break of the 
series. This is followed by the model estimation using the standard OLS method. 
Then, the general to the specific procedure will be carried out to reduce the 
inclusion of insignificant lag. The ARDL approach is applied to the model 3 and 
can be expressed as follow: 
𝛥𝛥𝑍𝑍 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑍𝑍 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−12+ �𝛽𝛽1𝛥𝛥𝑍𝑍 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 +𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1
 �𝛽𝛽2∆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 +𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖=0
 �𝛽𝛽3∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖=0
+ �𝛽𝛽4∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑖=0+ �𝛽𝛽5∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖2𝑣𝑣
𝑖𝑖=0
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡
In equation (4), the optimal lag will be chosen based on the lowest Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). α0  and εt  represent the intercept term and error 
term respectively, the long-run relationship between the stability and explanatory 
variable will be captured by the α1 α2,α3,α4  and α5. Where the short-run relationship, 
are denoted by the term with summation sign. The p,q,r,s and v are the lag length 
for the respective variable. As our study aims to identify the threshold level of 
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house price in explaining the relationship,  the turning point can be computed by-
(α4/2α5). (. Indeed, the collateral hypothesis will be supported if the coefficient of α4 
turn to be significantly positive in equation (4). However, coefficients of α5 will be 
negative and significant if the inverted U-shape relationship exists. In other words, 
the deviation hypothesis is supported- the bank is adversely affected given to the 
excessive run-up of house prices.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Results and Analysis
Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Maximum Minimum
ZISL 67 5.745 0.889 7.277 3.359
HPI 67 102.174 30.361 168.762 69.306
UN 67 3.339 0.288 4.076 2.799
COST 67 36.833 9.199 49.6 16.823
Variable
Level First Difference
ADF PP ADF PP
ZISLt -2.84* -2.81 -6.55*** -6.58***
HPIt -1.41 -0.05 -3.33* -7.31***
UNt -4.76*** -4.78*** -8.12*** -11.93***
COSTt -2.55 -2.59 -6.20*** -10.43***
We first presented the preliminary analysis of our data. In Table 1, the Z-score of 
Islamic banking is recorded highest at 7.28; and 3.36 at the lowest. On average, 
the Z-score reaches 5.75, and the series shows a marginal variation of 0.89. As 
for house prices, the price index is reported relatively more variation, ranging 
from 69.31 to 168.76 point. Such a high variation could be explained by the rapid 
acceleration between the period 2010 to 2012, due to the government policy shift. 
The unemployment rate is rather steady and almost achieves full employment rate. 
The mean value of the unemployment rate reaches 3.34% and the highest at 4.08%; 
lowest at 2.8%. As far as the bank-specific variable is concerned, the dispersion for 
cost efficiency ratio (COST) reported approximate 9.2, with a minimum value of 
16.82 and maximum at 49.6. 
Prior to the estimation of the relationship, we determine the integration 
order of each series. We applied the commonly used stationarity test, Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips Perron (PP) unit root test to determine the 
stationarity of the series.
Table 2.
ADF and PP Unit Root Test
Note: The constant and trend are included in the test equations. The SIC is used to select the optimal lag order in the ADF test 
equation. ***, **, * denotes the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 1.
Descriptive Analysis of the Variables
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Table 2 reports both the ADF and PP unit root tests; our result reveals that only 
unemployment is stationary at the level form. Meanwhile, z-score, house price 
index, and COST remained stationary after first difference by both test, suggesting 
property of I (1). 
Our study employed the structural break unit root test (Z-A,1992) and Perron 
(1997) in order to capture a possible structural break. Our result of Z-A unit root 
tests and the break year for each of the variables are presented in Table 3. After 
addressing the breakpoint, the Zivot and Andrew unit root test suggest that all 
our series are stationary at the levels, except the cost to income ratio. The Perron 
unit root test draws a similar conclusion. Both tests conclude a quite consistent 
breakpoint. According to the test, the structural break is detected during the 
period of 2005 to 2010. As Z-score is the dependent variable, we will focus on 
the breakpoint of Z-score. Our test identified that the breakpoint for Z-score 
occurs in 2010Q3. Refer to Figure 1, Z-score shows a downward trend after 2010. 
The restructuring of the financial system may explain such a phenomenon. The 
number of Islamic banks increased to seventeen as banking licenses were issued 
to foreign Islamic banking players in 2010. This translated to greater competition 
among the Islamic banks and caused the unexpected shift in the series.  
Variables
Level
Z-A test Perron test
t-statistics Break year t-statistics Break year
ZISLt -3.52*** 2009Q1 -4.09*** 2010Q3
HPIt -5.74*** 2008Q4 -6.97*** 2008Q3
UNt -5.30*** 2010Q2 -5.24*** 2010Q1
COSTt -4.59*** 2007Q3 -6.24*** 2007Q2
First Differences
ΔZISLt -7.08*** -7.08***
ΔHPIt -4.02*** -9.42***
Δ UNt -8.56*** -8.52***
Δ COSTt -6.70*** -6.83***
Table 3.
Zivot and Andrew (1992) and Perron (1997) Unit Root Test with Structural Breaks
Note: The constant and trend are included in the test equations. ***, **, * denotes the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Since our stationarity test concluded that all of our series are integrated at 
both level and after difference, ARDL approach is the most appropriate method to 
estimate the long run and short run relationship. Below, we proceed to the bound 
test to identify the long-run cointegration. The ARDL bound test result is given in 
table 4: 
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k 99% level 95% level 90% level
4 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52
F-statistic
fZISL (HPI, HPI2, UN, COST) 7.97
Dependent variable: ZISL Coef Std. Error
Long-run Coefficients
Intercept -0.4603 1.6629
HPIt 0.0724** 0.0340
HPI2t -0.0002* 0.0001
UNt -0.4007*** 0.1356
COSTISLt -0.0346** 0.0140
Error-correction coefficient -0.2233*** 0.0634
Short-run Coeffcients
ΔHPIt-1 -0.0495 0.0416
ΔHPIt-2 0.0623 0.1615
ΔHPIt-3 0.3308* 0.1647
ΔHPI2t 0.00003 0.0002
ΔHPI2t-2 -0.0006 0.0008
ΔHPI2t-3 -0.0015* 0.0009
ΔCOSISLTt -0.0104 0.0118
ΔCOSISLTt-1 0.0294 0.0118
ΔCOSISLTt-2 0.0151 0.0121
ΔCOSISLTt-3 0.0246** 0.0112
DUM -0.6262*** 0.1711
R2 0.5583
Diagnostic Test
Jarque Bera 1.6642
LM(2) 4.1540 (0.1253)
ARCH(2) 1.3042 (0.5209)
RESET(1) 12.7807 (0.000)
Table 4.
Critical Value Of The F-Statistic For The Bound Test Results with Unrestricted 
Intercept and No Time Trend
Table 5.
Effects of House Prices on Z-score for Islamic Bank. Model: ZISL=f(HPI, HPI2, UN, 
COST)2
Note: With a sample size of lesser than 100, the critical value is extracted from Narayan (2005), using an unrestricted intercept 
with no trend.
2. Aforementioned, the Z-score series was interpolated. To ensure the robustness of estimation, +/-5% 
of measurement error is added to the interpolated series, and value falls in the +/-5% interval was 
randomly selected to form a new dataset. Then, the cointegration test is repeated. The F-statistic 
value is reported to be 7.04, in which indicating the present of cointegration relationship under the 
new dataset. Also, we repeated the estimation of equation (4) using the new dataset and found no 
significant difference in the sign of coefficient
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Table 4 indicates that the calculated F-statistic for our model is greater than 
the critical value of the upper bound 7.97 at 1% significance level. Thus, we have 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between 
Islamic bank stability and the explanatory variables. Hence, we proceed with the 
estimation of the long run and short run relationship. The estimated long-run 
coefficients are presented in table 5.
In Table 53, our estimation suggests that the coefficient of the housing price,  
is 0.0724, and the quadratic term of the housing price,  is –0.0002. This implicates 
that a 1-unit point increase in house price index results in approximately 0.324 
unit (α4/α1) increases in Z-score for an Islamic bank, assuming other variables are 
constant. On the one hand, the Z-score declines by 0.009 (α5/α1) when the house 
price square rises by 10-unit point. The long-run coefficients of unemployment 
rate appears to be significant. Z-score decreases by 1.79 unit (α2 /α1) for every 
1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, when other variables 
are unchanged.  Indeed, the negative relationship between the Z-score and the 
unemployment rate seems justified. Even though the Malaysian unemployment 
rate remains stable, it has a direct impact on the Z-score. The impact of a higher 
unemployment rate is transmitted to bank stability by lower demand for loans. 
Alleviation of the loan demand has significantly affected the bank’s financial ratio, 
in particular, the ratio between an interest-bearing asset and a liability (Moinescu, 
2012). Besides that, the cost to income ratio (COST) has been included as a bank-
specific variable. The cost to income rate has been used as a proxy for management 
efficiency. Our result confirms that, in the long run, the Z-score rises by 0.155 unit 
for every unit point increase in the cost-to-income ratio, assuming other variables 
have not changed. Similarly, Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) argue that better cost 
efficiency enhances bank stability. 
In the short run, our estimation provides evidence of the presence of 
nonlinearity relationship between housing prices and bank stability, but with a 
lagged. The Z-score seems to only respond to the house price changes after three 
quarters pass. Meanwhile, the short run coefficients for the cost to income ratio 
yield a positive sign implicates that higher cost to income ratio has a positive 
impact on the bank stability.  One possible explanation is bank stability improved 
when the higher cost to income ratio generates more profit in the short run. As 
we found a structural break from 2010Q3, we have included a dummy variable to 
capture the effects of the restructuring of the financial system4. Our result indicates 
that the restructuring of the financial system in 2010 has a negative and significant 
effect on the Z-score. This implies the financial restructuring has eroded the 
Z-score of Islamic bank. Under a more competitive environment, the bank may 
strive to remain the profit margin and result in taking a riskier policy (Jimenez et 
al., 2013). To sum up, the outcome is supportive of the deviation hypothesis, in 
which consistent with the study by Von Peter (2009) and Gerlach & Peng (2005). 
3. ROA, ROE and Cost to income ratio are the control variables. However, only cost to income ratio is 
found to be significantly related to the Z-score. As such, our result in table 5 has not included ROA 
and ROE. The optimal lag length was selected according to the AIC, lag order 4 was selected by the 
criterion. General to specific approach is adopted and obtain the final specification in table 4.
4. In 2010, Malaysian government has issued more new banking license to the foreign bank. The 
banking industry may become more competitive.
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Importantly, the relationship is suggested to be concave as opposed to the linear 
relationship found in the past studies. Such finding provides implications that a 
persistent expansion of house prices in Malaysia increases the exposure of bank 
after a certain threshold value.  
The residual diagnostic tests of normality, heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation are performed to ensure the model is adequately estimated. Results 
are presented in table 4. All tests are reported to be insignificant and indicating the 
estimations meets with the underlying classical assumption. The stability test of 
recursive residuals using CUSUM and CUSUM square in appendix B (figure 2 & 
3) ascertain that the estimated parameters are stable at 5% level and no evidence 
showing that the model is mis-specified. 
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Figure 2.
CUSUM (ZISL=f(HPI, HPI2, UN, COST).
Figure 3.
CUSUMSQ (ZISL=f(HPI, HPI2, UN, COST)
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4.2. Proper test for U-shaped or inverted U-shape
As the conventional econometric model is inadequate in testing the null hypothesis 
of the existence of a quadratic relationship between the variables (Lind and 
Mehlum, 2010), U-test is applied to confirm our findings of the non-monotonic 
relationship between the bank stability and house prices. The result is presented 
in table 6.  
ZISL
Slope at HPImin 0.0367*
-1.5555
Slope at HPI max -0.0334***
(-2.4007)
Sasabuchi-Lind-Mehlum (SLM) test of U-Shape or 
inverted U-Shape
1.56
P-value 0.0625
Estimated extreme threshold Point 121.398
99% confidence of Fieller interval [69.306,168.762]
If the null hypothesis is rejected, the non-monotonic relationship between 
variables can be confirmed. Our result reveals that the lower bound slope of house 
price index is positive (0.0367) and negative in the upper bound slope (-0.033). Both 
lower and upper bound slopes are statistically significant. This reflects that the 
hypothesis of no U-shape relationship between house price and Z-score is rejected. 
In other words, our model suggests that an inverted U-shape relationship exists 
between house price and Z-score. In sum, the result of Sasabuchi-Lind-Mehlum 
(SLM) test validates our findings present in table 5.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1. Conclusion
The Islamic banking industry has a long history in Malaysia. Within three decades 
this industry has accumulated USD65.5 billion and with a stable annual growth rate 
of 18-20%. Recognizing the great role of Islamic banking in Malaysia, we evaluated 
the impact of house price on Islamic bank stability. In looking at a relationship 
between house price and bank stability, we considered the nonlinear perspective. 
Our study employed the ARDL model, introduced the quadratic polynomials 
of house price in the estimation. The result we obtained suggests a nonlinear 
relationship between house price and Z-score. More importantly, the relationship 
should be indeed a concave relationship, which hints the “fundamental-deviation 
effect” that dominated the “collateral value effect” when the price further 
expanded. The persistent deviation from the fundamental result in the buildup 
of risk. The finding is confirmed by conducting the U-test, which revealed that 
Z-score started to drop when house price exceeded 121.398.
Table 6.
Test of A U-Shape and Inverted U-Shaped Relationship.
Notes: T-value in parenthesis. *** and * indicates significant at 1% and 10% level.
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5.2. Recommendation
To sum up, the finding is particularly significant for both researchers and industry 
practitioners to have a better position to carry off the potential financial risk well 
with proper practice. For the policymakers, this study provides implication and 
raises concern over the upsurge of the property price in the most recent year. 
As our study found evidence of a concave relationship between house price and 
Z-score, this suggests that the stability depends upon the low or high level of the 
house prices. When the house price is high and is deviated from the fundamental, 
the bank risk increases, even though by law, an Islamic bank is not permitted 
to hold any risky asset, the persistent raised of housing prices may cause an 
imbalance in the housing market and jeopardize the bank stability. To ensure the 
soundness of the bank, policymakers should focus on maintaining the optimal 
growth of house price. In doing so, our study suggests the policy may direct to 
limit the homeownership or individual purchase limit, especially the foreigner. 
This could help to curb the excessive growth of house price. Meanwhile, based 
on our finding, efficiency in cost management is also vital to reduce the risk of an 
Islamic bank. The cost efficiency of a bank was generally considered as a central 
focus to remain the bank’s competitiveness. The more cost efficiency the bank, the 
better bank’s performance and stability.
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No. Local Banks Sample Period
1 Maybank Islamic Berhad 2000-2016
2 Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2000-2016
3 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2000-2016
4 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2000-2016
5 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2000-2016
6 Ambank Islamic Berhad 2000-2016
7 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2000-2016
8 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2001-2016
9 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2001-2016
Appendix.
Table A1.
Sample of Banks
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